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and drew lessons learned from the experience. The author argued that the mission 
was successful in restoring peace and stability in Burundi, although the disarma-
ment, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) component of its mission was not 
achieved. The willingness of the African Union (AU) to send a peacekeeping mis-
sion as a stabilizing force within an ongoing conflict shows that the organization 
is serious about tackling security issues on the continent. In spite of AU’s endeav-
ours, the article establishes that the AU is being challenged by what is called the 
‘triangular area of tension in African peacekeeping (AU’s ambitions versus AU’s 
peacekeeping capacities versus member states’ political will and agendas). The 
article concludes with a reflection on lessons learnt from AMIB as a prelude to 
addressing this area of tension for better future peacekeeping performances in 
Africa.
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…in the absence of the AU mission, Burundi would have been left to its own devices, 
which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent conflict. (Murithi, 2008, 
p. 75)
By the end of its mission, AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most 
provinces in Burundi…. (Murithi, 2009, p. 6)
Introduction
This article explores the African Union’s (AU) role as a security and peace 
consolidation actor in Africa, especially the way in which it relates to its 
peacekeeping operations. Against the backdrop of the AU’s Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), the article examines the African Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) in order to explain its achievements and challenges, which Bogland, 
Egnell and Lagerström (2008) referred to as a ‘triangular area of tension in AU 
peace operations’. In addition, I briefly analyse the lessons learnt from the mission 
for improving future peace operations in Africa. AMIB was the pioneering AU 
armed peace operation and its deployment was authorised in 2003 before the 
inauguration of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. AMIB mirrored 
the pan-African organisation’s ambition to intervene in African conflicts where 
the United Nations (UN) either was not too interested or delayed in responding to 
a volatile conflict situation in which there was no comprehensive peace agreement. 
Based on the assertion in the epigraphs above, three analytical questions are 
pertinent and addressed in this article. First, did AMIB balance the triangular area 
of tension in African peacekeeping, namely, the AU’s ambitions, the organisation’s 
peacekeeping capacity and its member states’ political will and agendas? Second, 
were the optimisms embedded in the APSA in terms of its ability to guarantee 
African security realised with the AU’s experiences in Burundi? Third, what 
lessons were learned from AMIB in order to address this triangular area of tension 
in African peacekeeping?
This article addresses these questions but this cannot be done in the absence of 
an understanding of the AU security agenda and the context in which AMIB was 
deployed and operated. First, I discuss both the APSA and the conflict history of 
Burundi. The conflict history is discussed through a periodisation of Burundi’s 
cycle of conflict. This is followed by the analysis of Africa’s mediation efforts that 
led to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements for Burundi 
(the Arusha Agreement) in August 2000 and the subsequent ceasefire agreements 
made between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the armed 
groups in October and December 2002, which provided the basis for AMIB’s 
deployment.1 Then I examine AMIB right from its conceptualisation to 
deployment. The mission’s positive and negative experiences are also explored 
against its objectives, and the aforementioned triangular area of tension in African 
peace operations. I assess AMIB in order to question the extent to which the 
APSA’s rhetoric has been put into practice. I conclude with a reflection on lessons 
learnt from AMIB by the AU as a prelude to how to address this area of tension 
for better future peacekeeping performances in Africa.
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The African Union and the African Peace and Security 
Architecture
The AU formally replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in July 2002. 
Established in May 1963, the OAU was to find solutions to problems confronting 
Africa at the time. Principally, the OAU was to end colonial rule in Africa, 
promote African unity, settle conflicts between its member states through peace-
ful means and work towards the improvement of the well-being of the African 
people (Imobighe, 1989). The OAU Charter emphasised the principles of non-
interference in the internal affairs of its members and the sovereign equality of 
African countries among others (Article III, The OAU Charter, 1963). While the 
organisation was able to perform creditably in the area of decolonisation where it 
was crowned with dismantling the apartheid system in South Africa in the early 
1990s, much cannot be said in term of its performance in other areas of conflict 
management. Throughout of its existence (1963–2002), the OAU was hamstrung 
by its ‘non-interference’ principle. This principle made it difficult for the organi-
sation’s involvement in matters regarded as the internal conflict affairs of member 
states. Its conflict management effort in interstate conflict did not fare better, 
while its peacekeeping operation in Chad in the early 1980s was a miserable 
failure. Additionally, the OAU lacked the resources (both human and material) 
and technical capacity to undertake complex peacekeeping. The OAU member 
states’ political will to really support the organisation was lacking as African 
leaders were fond of pursuing national and/or personal agendas that often contra-
dicted the OAU Charter. These factors and the new challenges confronting Africa 
at the end of the Cold War—globalisation, AIDS/HIV pandemic and democracy 
and good governance—made the OAU irrelevant in the evolving post-1989 inter-
national order and therefore its replacement was important (Sesay, 2008).
As part of their efforts to replace the OAU with a vibrant and proactive organi-
sation, African leaders signed the AU legal document, the AU Constitutive Act 
(the Act) in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000. The Act replaced the OAU’s non-interference 
principle with that of non-indifference to conflict. Although the Act retains some 
of the OAU’s principles, especially those dealing with sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of its member states (Article 3b), and the principle of non-interference 
by any member state in the internal affairs of another member state (Article 4g), 
these principles do not prevent AU intervention in internal armed conflict situa-
tions. For, Article 4(h) of the Act empowers the AU ‘to intervene in a member 
state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ (OAU, 2000). Thus, 
Article 4(h) represents one of the cornerstones of the credibility of the AU as a 
security actor. Equally important is that the Act emphasises the ‘[t]he right of 
member states to request intervention from the Union to restore peace and 
security’ (Article 4j). With the provisions of the various sections of Article 4, 
Africa moved away from unqualified respect for state sovereignty to an approach 
where the duty to protect populations and ‘the right to intervention’ shapes AU’s 
security management agenda.
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At the inaugural AU Summit in July 2002, African leaders adopted the ‘Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU’ 
(the PSC Protocol) (Africa-Union, 2002). The PSC Protocol institutionalised the 
AU conflict management mechanisms to enforce the Act’s new norms—the 
APSA. At the heart of the APSA is the PSC that is established as a standing 
decision-making body for conflict management. Replacing the Central Organ of 
the OAU Mechanism,2 the PSC functions as a collective security and early 
warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict 
situations in Africa (Article 2(1), AU, 2002). The council is composed of 15 
countries, of which 5 countries—1 country each per geographical region (Central, 
East, North, Southern and West Africa)—are elected to serve for a 3-year term, 
while the remaining 10 countries are to serve for a 2-year term.3 This arrangement 
ensures continuity of the council. The Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental 
Early Warning System (CEWS), the Peace Funds (the Fund), an African Standby 
Force (ASF) including a Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the AU Commission 
(the Commission) support the PSC. Therefore, the APSA provides an all-
encompassing set of instruments to address African security needs by African 
actors (Makinda & Okumu, 2008).
The PoW was inaugurated in December 2007. The Panel supports the PSC and 
AU Commission Chairperson in the area of conflict prevention through its advi-
sory roles (Article 11(1), AU, 2002). It consists of five members—one from each 
of Africa’s five sub-regions. These are well-respected African personalities who 
have already contributed significantly to African peace, security and development. 
The CEWS anticipates and prevents conflicts. It is designed to gather and analyse 
information that will help the AU prevent conflicts in a timely manner (Article 
12(1), AU, 2002). The CEWS builds on the Regional Economic Communities’ 
(RECs)/Regional Mechanisms’ (RM) early warning mechanisms. The CEWS fur-
nishes the AU Commission Chairperson with information and data through which 
he or she may advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to African security 
and recommend the best course of action (Article 12(5), AU, 2002). In terms of its 
structure, the CEWS consists of the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) 
known as ‘The Situation Room’ based at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, and 
the Observation and Monitoring Units (OMUs) of the RMs. The Situation Room is 
to be linked directly to the RMs’ OMUs through appropriate means of communica-
tion. The OMUs are to continuously collect and process data at their respective 
levels and transmit them to the Situation Room. Based on the data collected through 
the multi-levelled African early warning system, the AU can then take prompt 
actions in response to a threat of violent conflict that could disturb African security 
(Engel & Gomes, 2009). The Peace Funds was established to provide funding for 
AU security activities. The Fund is financed directly through requisitions from the 
AU’s regular budget, including arrears of contributions and voluntary contribu-
tions from states and private sources (Article 21(2), AU, 2002). The ASF is the 
implementing arm of the PSC. It is made up of regional brigades ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriate notice. The ASF empowers the AU to conduct prompt 
and robust peace missions in response to complex emergencies requiring quick 
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military deployments (within 30–90 days, depending on the type of operation) as 
decided by the PSC. The MSC advises and supports PSC and the ASF on all matters 
relating to military and security (Neethling, 2005).
The AU works with Africa’s sub-regional organisations known as the RECs in 
the operationalisation of the APSA. Therefore, the RECs are the pillars of the 
APSA. The PSC Protocol puts an accent on the AU’s cooperation and effective 
coordination with the RECs’ security mechanisms—known as RMs. Overall, the 
APSA seeks to guarantee African security with its three main imperatives—‘Try 
Africa First’, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and ‘Africa Must Unite’. Thus, the 
APSA functions as a proactive security regime to address Africa’s democratic and 
governance deficits and also strives to promote socio-economic development and 
guarantee human security in Africa (Badmus, 2012).
A Synopsis of Burundi’s Cycle of Violent Conflict  
and Africa’s Peace Mediations
Burundi, with a population of about 8 million, comprising approximately 85 per 
cent Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Twa, gained its independence in 1962 
from Belgium (CIA). The tense relations among these groups, especially between 
Hutu and Tutsi, have plunged Burundi into a cycle of conflicts. The Burundian 
conflict is rooted in the unequal distribution of state power and socio-economic 
benefits along ethnic fault-lines. The country’s major institutions such as the 
military and judiciary are privatised and controlled by a small section of the 
country’s population. The alienated segment of the population becomes frustrated 
because its interests are perceived as being marginalised. Despite the Hutu’s 
demographic advantage, the minority Tutsi have dominated Burundi’s military 
and political–economic lives in both the pre- and post-independence periods 
(Lemarchand, 1995) and ethnicity has become an instrument in the hands of the 
political elite for political and socio-economic competition. The Tutsi’s control of 
power has on many occasions caused Hutu uprisings.
In April 1972, Hutu insurgents from Tanzania crossed into south of Burundi and 
carried out systematic attacks (genocide) on Tutsi killing between 2,000 and 3,000 
Tutsi. A large-scale reprisal from the army led to the death of 100,000–200,000 
Hutu (Manirakiza, 2005, pp. 45–45; Nyankanzi, 1998). In September 1987, Major 
Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, seized power in a bloody coup. This incident was followed 
by another Hutu uprising against Tutsi peasants, organised by the Hutu political 
organisation—Party for the Liberation of Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)—in 
August 1988, in the north of the country (The African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes [ACCORD], 2007). The uprising caused massive reprisals 
conducted by the military against the Hutu in which many were killed and over 
100,000 people became homeless. The international community condemned the 
tragic events and strong external pressures forced Burundi to carry out democratic 
political reforms. By the end of 1988, Buyoya embarked on democratic reforms, 
which culminated in the introduction of a multiparty system in 1992. The new 
democratic experiment was put to the test in June 1993 and a new Hutu-dominated 
non-armed political party—the Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU)—defeated 
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Buyoya’s party—Union for National Progress (UPRONA)—while its leader, 
Melchior Ndadaye, became Burundi’s first democratically elected Hutu president. 
Ndadaye formed a government of national unity (Southall, 2006). Thereafter, 
Burundi witnessed the outbreak of a civil war in October 1993 following the 
assassination of Ndadaye by the extremist elements within the Tutsi-dominated 
Burundian army.
Consequent to the death of Ndadaye, the Hutu massacred many Tutsi. The 
tense situation resulted in retaliations by the combination of the army, gendarmerie 
and militias in the indiscriminate killings of Hutu peasants and officials (Bellamy 
& Williams, 2005). The wave of inter-ethnic killings after Ndadaye’s death were, 
as Jackson (2006) noted, ‘built on ground already poisoned by decades of colonial 
divide-and-rule, ethnicised violence around independence in 1962, and a failed 
insurrection in 1972’. The violence claimed between 250,000 and 300,000 lives 
(Daley, 2006). Amid the tense political atmosphere, a Hutu politician, Cyprian 
Ntaryamira, succeeded Ndadaye (Southall, 2006).
Burundi was further sucked into a vortex of conflict in April 1994 when 
Ntaryamira and his Rwandan counterpart Juvenal Habyarimana were both killed 
when their airplane was shot down over Kigali on their way from a regional peace 
meeting in Tanzania. Another political crisis followed Ntaryamira’s death and this 
prompted the UN to begin negotiations with the parties. In September 1994, the 
UN brokered ‘the Convention of Government’ that called for the establishment of 
a coalition government with a president from FRODEBU and a prime minister 
from UPRONA. Pursuant to this agreement, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya—a Hutu 
politician—was appointed president in October 1994 (Boshoff, 2010). Afterwards, 
the transitional arrangement suffered setbacks. As Ntibantunganya tried to 
accommodate the demands of the military, he felt the wrath of the radical elements 
within FRODEBU who believed that they had been alienated by a creeping coup. 
The radical elements eventually split to form the National Council for the Defence 
of Democracy (CNDD) and its armed group Forces for the Defence of Democracy 
(FDD). This development, together with UPRONA’s withdrawal from the 
parliament and government, resulted in a new round of violence in which many 
people were killed, while many became refugees in neighbouring countries.
The military–political situations in Burundi prompted the leaders of the Great 
Lakes region to hold the first regional conference on Burundi in Kigali, Rwanda. In 
November 1995, these leaders announced the formation of a ‘Regional Peace 
Initiative on Burundi’ (RPI), and former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere was 
asked to lead the peace efforts. At Nyerere’s request the regional leaders, with the 
OAU and UN’s support, met with the representatives of FRODEBU, UPRONA 
and other smaller parties in Arusha, Tanzania, to discuss the security situation in 
Burundi. At the meeting, Ntibantunganya was reluctant to accept the regional 
initiative of sending peacekeeping forces to Burundi and the idea was rejected by 
the Burundian army (Boshoff, 2010). These peace efforts, unfortunately, failed to 
stop the Tutsi insurgency. On 25 July 1996, the early successes of the regional 
efforts were upset by the Burundian army’s overthrowing of Ntibantunganya and 
the reinstalling of Buyoya as president (Adebajo, 2011).
The economic sanctions imposed on Burundi by regional leaders forced 
Buyoya to withdraw from the Arusha peace process and he opted for internal 
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settlement of the political crisis. The sanctions were interpreted by the Tutsi as 
evidence of Nyerere’s support to the Hutu cause. Buyoya undertook efforts 
to generate a national dialogue while he also forged close partnerships for 
peace among the government, judiciary and civil society organisations. Buyoya 
unbanned political parties and restored the 1993 parliament. He negotiated 
directly with the CNDD and successfully engaged with FRODEBU and by May 
1998, the FRODEBU members that remained in Burundi re-entered the govern-
ment. Then Buyoya agreed to revive the Arusha process.
In June 1998, Nyerere convened the Arusha II meeting that was attended by the 
government, national assembly and 17 political parties including UPRONA 
and FRODEBU. However, the Arusha talks sparked off splits in the CNDD and 
PALIPEHUTU when factions that had the allegiances of the majority of their 
armed wings, the FDD and National Liberation Force (FNL), respectively, 
demanded recognition for these armed groups as independent organisations.4 The 
Regional Initiative decided to continue the negotiations with the political organi-
sations in the absence of PALIPEHUTU—FNL and CNDD—FDD to secure a 
political agreement, hoping that a ceasefire agreement with the military factions 
would be secured later. The former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, 
became the new facilitator in November 1999 following the death of Nyerere.
Against all odds,5 Mandela successfully negotiated the Arusha Agreement on 
28 August 2000. The agreement is not a comprehensive one in that only 13 out of 
the 19 delegations signed it.6 The remaining six parties that refused to sign were 
all Tutsi parties and due to regional pressures the remaining parties eventually 
signed the agreement at a regional summit in September 2000. The Arusha 
Agreement established a framework for a transitional settlement of the conflict 
leading to national elections.
The Arusha Agreement did not lead to a reduction in conflict and the idea of 
deploying an African force to provide VIP protection to returning politicians 
taking part in the peace process did not materialise. The idea suffered a setback 
because many African states were unwilling to contribute troops because no 
ceasefire agreement was in place. To implement the agreement, Mandela per-
suaded Pretoria to deploy troops—South African Protection Support Detachment 
(SAPSD)—in Burundi. The SAPSD’s deployment started in late October 2001. 
Once completely deployed, its force strength stood at just over 700 men. Despite 
its initial opposition from the Burundian army, SAPSD was able to overcome this 
challenge and then focused on its assigned functions. The SAPSD operated on a 
very limited mandate as a protection force, and under the rules of its mandate, 
troops would be withdrawn in case they become the object of attack.
The SAPSD stabilised Bujumbura, the Burundian capital, but it was not enough 
to ameliorate the Burundian security situation overall. SAPSD was Bujumbura 
based, it neither protected the civilian population nor performed a broader 
peacekeeping function, while the humanitarian situation continued to worsen. 
Between October and December 2002, two ceasefire agreements were signed but 
the belligerents did not respect them. With the deteriorating security and 
humanitarian situations, the deputy president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, who 
had been helping Mandela in facilitating the peace process, requested the UN and 
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donor community’s contributions to the initiative of deploying an African force in 
Burundi. South Africa’s proposal was later accepted and it set the stage for the AU 
peace operation in Burundi.
The African Mission in Burundi
Conceptualisation and Deployment
The Arusha Agreement and the subsequent ceasefire agreements provided the 
basis for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, despite the 
ambiguities in the provisions of the various agreements regarding the authorising 
institution for such a peacekeeping mission. Article 8 of Protocol V of the Arusha 
Agreement stated that ‘immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the 
Burundi Government shall submit to the United Nations (UN) a request for an 
international peacekeeping force’. But under Article III of the October 2002 
Ceasefire Agreement, the signatories (TGoB and the Burundi Armed Political 
Parties and Movements—APPMs) agreed that the ‘verification and control of 
the ceasefire may be conducted by a UN mandated mission, or an African Union 
(AU) [mission]’. Furthermore, Article III of the December 2002 Ceasefire 
Agreement provided that the ‘verification and control of the ceasefire agreement 
shall be conducted by an African mission’, a provision that contradicted both the 
provisions of the Arusha and the October 2002 Ceasefire Agreements. The incon-
sistencies in the various agreements regarding which institution was to be respon-
sible for peace operation, together with the AU’s strong position against war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Africa, and the fact that the UN 
would not deploy a peacekeeping force in the absence of a comprehensive peace 
agreement spurred the AU to deploy AMIB.
The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism during its 91st Ordinary Session in 
Addis Ababa mandated the deployment of AMIB on 2 April 2003.7 A number of 
factors accounted for AMIB’s deployment. First, Burundi’s conflict was seen by 
both the AU and the RPI in the context of the interlocking nature of the wider 
Great Lakes region’s conflict dynamics. Regional leaders were convinced that the 
existence of peace in Burundi is a precondition for and a first step towards stabil-
ity in the Great Lakes region. Second, and also from the AU’s perspective, AMIB’s 
deployment could be located within the context of the APSA, for it served as an 
opportunity for the AU to showcase the APSA’s main imperatives—‘Africa Must 
Unite’, ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ and ‘Try Africa First’—and the AU’s self-
imposed responsibility as a security actor in Africa to the broader international 
community (Powell, 2005).
AMIB’s deployment was for an initial 1-year period and subject to renewal by 
the Central Organ pending the deployment of a UN mission as envisioned in the 
agreement between the UN and the AU. The Central Organ agreed that AMIB’s 
mandate would be renewed every 6 months after the expiration of its initial 12 
months period. The purpose/end-state of the mission was stated in its mandate as 
follows: ‘AMIB will have fulfilled its mandate after it has facilitated the imple-
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mentation of the ceasefire agreements, and the defence and security situation in 
Burundi is stable and well-managed by newly created national defence and secu-
rity structures.’ With this end-state in view, AMIB was assigned a set of objectives 
that involved supervising the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; 
supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex- 
combatants; creating favourable conditions for the presence of a UN peacekeep-
ing mission; and contributing to political and economic stability in Burundi. To 
achieve these objectives, the African mission was mandated to perform specific 
operational tasks. These included the following tasks: establishment, maintenance 
and liaison between the parties; monitoring and verifying the implementation 
of the ceasefire agreements; facilitating the activities of the Joint Ceasefire 
Commission (JCC) and Technical Committees responsible for the establishment 
of new National Defence and Police Forces; facilitating delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons; and 
providing VIP protection for designated returning leaders (Aboagye, 2004).
AMIB was conceptualised as an integrated peace mission, comprising 
military contingents (MILCONs) and civilian personnel, and it had a Civil–
Military Coordination Centre (CIMICC). The civilian component was to help the 
mission with logistics and administrative support, and promote mutual under-
standing among AMIB, TGoB and the local population. The Special Representative 
of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Burundi, Ambassador Mamadou 
Bah (Guinea), was appointed Head of Mission (HoM). His senior assistants were 
Ambassador Welile Nhlapo (South Africa) and Retired Lieutenant General Martin 
Mwakalindile (Tanzania).8 AMIB was under the overall direction of the HoM. 
The HoM and the Force Commander were jointly responsible for the provision of 
progress reports dealing with the implementation of AMIB’s mandate to the 
Central Organ. Troop contributions were from South Africa, Ethiopia and 
Mozambique with a small military observer contingent (MILOB) of 43 personnel 
drawn from Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Mali, Gabon and Togo. At the conceptual 
level, AMIB, once completely deployed, amounted to around 3,335 troops. South 
Africa agreed to send one battalion, two additional companies and other elements 
totalling 1,600 troops; while Ethiopia and Mozambique, respectively, promised to 
send one battalion and two additional companies, and one strengthened company 
of approximately 280 troops (Aboagye, 2004). However, at the zenith of the oper-
ation, AMIB force strength numbered only 3,128 troops (Williams, 2006, p. 353). 
South Africa, which was the leading nation of the mission, appointed a Force 
Commander Major General Sipho Binda, while Ethiopia assigned Brigadier 
General G. Ayele as Deputy Force Commander of AMIB.
With the deployment of AMIB, the mission replaced the SAPSD. The integra-
tion of more than 700 SAPSD into AMIB as its advance party on 1 May 2003 and 
the arrival of advance elements from Ethiopia and Mozambique on 18 and 26 
May 2003, respectively, launched the mission into operation. Subsequently, South 
Africa increased its troops close to its authorised strength of 1,600 troops. But 
AMIB was not fully operational until the arrival of the main bodies of the 
Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents between 27 September and 17 October 
2003. The Force headquarters was established on 27 April 2003, while the inte-
grated mission headquarters was established on 1 June 2003 following the arrival 
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of the advance elements from Ethiopia and Mozambique. The late arrival of the 
main bodies of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents delayed AMIB in 
reaching close to its authorised strength. Bellamy and Williams (2005) blamed the 
delay on financial limitations of these two troop-contributing countries (TCCs) 
and the fragility of the country’s ceasefire. The situation became worse due to the 
AU’s decision that the TCCs were to be self-sustained for the first 60 days of 
deployment before AU reimbursements, a requirement that only a few African 
TCCs could meet (Svensson, 2008, p. 13). The deployments of the Ethiopian and 
Mozambican contingents were made possible with support from the US and UK 
governments, respectively.
Furthermore, AMIB’s concept of operations (CONOPs) exemplified a division 
of operational responsibility among the TCCs in a peace mission. Although it was 
established that AMIB headquarters would be based in Bujumbura, the South 
African and Ethiopian troops, respectively, were to provide and establish outer 
protection and inner security for two demobilisation centres (DCs) at Muyange 
(Bubanza Province) and Buhinga (Rutana Province). The third DC was to be estab-
lished as the operation demanded. As part of the DDR process, AMIB was 
envisioned to be able to canton and disarm about 20,000 former combatants. 
Additionally, the protection of AMIB participating countries’ sustainment convoys 
and of all other movements, including those of humanitarian NGOs, became the 
responsibility of the Mozambican contingent. The South African Protection and 
Reaction Unit was responsible for VIP protection of returning politicians. AMIB’s 
CONOPs was also based on clear rules of engagement (RoE) and codes of conduct 
(CoC) that were based on international law, international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and the principle of self-defence. Senior AMIB officials drafted the RoE, which 
focused on the protection of AMIB’s personnel and equipment. Furthermore, 
the HoM, acting in conjunction with the Force Commander, was authorised to 
adjust the RoE but only after due consultation with the AU. Another important 
dimension of AMIB’s CONOPs was the cooperation between the MILCONs and 
civilian elements; this function of cooperation focused on three important areas—
humanitarian support to the civilian populations and former fighters, DDR and 
civil–military relations with the Government of Burundi (Aboagye, 2004).
Having conceptualised AMIB, the key question is posed as follows: Did AMIB 
succeed in realising its mandates? I answer this question in the next section by 
examining AMIB’s achievements and challenges based on its activities in the tri-
angular area of tension in African peace operations. In discussing AMIB’s 
achievements, I adopt two key criteria. First, I question the extent to which AMIB 
was able to realise its mandate and second, whether the operation was able to 
contribute to the creation of a stable and secure environment in Burundi.
AMIB’s Achievements and the ‘Triangular Area of  
Tension in African Peacekeeping’
Judging by its first objective of supervising the implementation of ceasefire agree-
ments, AMIB could be credited for achieving this important role. The presence of 
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the African force helped to deter further political violence and stabilised the 
country with the exception of Bujumbura Rural where Rwansa’s PALIPEHUTU—
FNL remained very active (Murithi, 2009). Aboagye (2004) estimated that about 
95 per cent of the entire country was relatively stable at the end of the operation. 
The relative stability in Burundi brought about by the presence AMIB was condu-
cive to moving the peace process forward. AMIB halted the escalation of violence 
and was able to manage the violent aspects of the conflict. The reduction of politi-
cal violence was replaced by acts of criminality in late 2003 but AMIB was able 
to handle this and also helped in overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreements and facilitated the CNDD—FDD’s participation in the peace process. 
In this respect, with its limited resources, the AU committed a significant share of 
its resources to VIP protection; this was for the leaders of the armed groups return-
ing to Burundi to participate in the peace process. If not for AMIB’s intervention, 
Burundi would have witnessed a more dangerous violent conflict (beyond what it 
was before AMIB operation) with far more devastating consequences, as stated in 
the first epigraph of this article.
AMIB did not achieve much in terms of its DDR objective. The mission was 
envisioned to implement the World Bank-funded DDR programme, which 
involved cantonment and disarming of about 20,000 ex-combatants. Soon after its 
deployment, AMIB, at the invitation of the World Bank, joined the Multi-country 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and became part of a joint 
planning group for the implementation of the DDR programme. But due to a 
number of challenges, including the delay by the TGoB in meeting the World 
Bank’s requirements, the implementation of the DDR programme did not 
commence until December 2004, 6 months after the expiration of AMIB’s 
mandate. Despite these challenges and its limited resources, AMIB went ahead to 
implement its DDR mandate. The first cantonment area was set up in Muyange in 
June/July 2003. The second cantonment site was not established until towards the 
end of AMIB operation in May 2004 (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006). The challenge of 
the triangular area of tension in African peacekeeping manifested because the AU 
lacked resources to sustain its force and as a result, its mission was unable to 
canton a large number of ex-combatants. Afterwards, the cantonment area ran out 
of food, medical supplies and lacked tangible infrastructure. For sustainability 
of the Muyange cantonment site, the HoM used his influence to secure 
assistance from international donors. At the Muyange cantonment area, AMIB 
was able to assemble and disarm 189 members from CNDD–FDD of Jean- 
Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and PALIPEHUTU–FNL of Alain Mugabarabona. By 
November 2003, the number of disarmed ex-combatants increased to 228 
(Boshoff, 2010). In addition, AMIB was successful in finding suitable DC areas 
and Pre-Disarmament Assembly Areas (PDAAs). This effort culminated in 
AMIB’s identification of 11 PDAAs. Former fighters cantoned at Muyange were 
subsequently transferred to the PDAAs in December 2003 and January 2004.
AMIB’s third objective stated that the mission was to strive towards ensuring 
that conditions were created for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. 
How was AMIB’s performance in this area? The mission’s performance in this 
respect could be described a success. The political–security situations in Burundi 
were volatile when AMIB was deployed. The absence of a comprehensive peace 
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agreement meant that AMIB had to operate in a fluid security environment. The 
African mission mitigated the escalating violent conflict and stabilised about 
95 per cent of the entire country by the end of its operation; the UN Evaluation 
Team recognised this achievement when they concluded in February 2004 that the 
conditions in Burundi were now appropriate for the deployment of a UN peace-
keeping mission. On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed 
Resolution 1545 which authorised the deployment of a UN peace operation in 
Burundi (ONUB by its French acronym) with an annual budget of $333.2 million. 
This was in line with the agreement with the AU that AMIB would give way to a 
multidimensional UN peace mission in Burundi. The fact that at the expiration of 
AMIB’s mandate the UNSC was able to authorise the deployment of ONUB to 
replace the African mission attests to AMIB’s success in creating conditions 
suitable for the presence of a UN peace mission (Bellamy & Williams, 2005). On 
1 June 2004, the UN officially took over the peace mission with a peacebuilding 
mandate. The rebadged AMIB peacekeepers formed their advance party while 
other contingents were from Nepal, Pakistan and Kenya (Williams, 2006). One 
important point of note here is that AMIB helped to stabilise the political and 
security situations in 2004, and laid the foundations for a more multidimensional 
peacebuilding process in mid-2004. The ONUB operation ended in December 
2006 after it successfully completed its mandate, and the UN Integrated Office in 
Burundi (BINUB by its French acronym) replaced ONUB with the mandate to 
coordinate international assistance.
In its fourth objective of contributing to political and economic stability in 
Burundi, AMIB’s achievement in this regard is partial. Undoubtedly, AMIB 
helped to manage the conflict but the mission was constrained in many ways, 
among which were the attacks on civilian population and the cantonment areas. 
The December 2003 Human Rights Watch Report blamed both the Burundian 
army and the armed factions for deliberate attacks on the civilian population in 
violation of IHL. These challenges negatively affected AMIB’s ability to fully 
realise its objective. Besides, the displaced people based in the eight Burundian 
provinces and refugees in the three (refugee) camps in Tanzania were supposed to 
be integrated into society and given their means of engaging in livelihood activi-
ties as defined in terms of their accessibility to allocated land. Unfortunately, 
those disarmed ex-combatants in the DCs were not provided with economic 
opportunities because the AU lacked resources and this made their reintegration 
into society problematic (Murithi, 2008). AMIB was unable to accomplish this 
objective. A critical look at this mandated objective raised the question: What is 
the domain of military peacekeepers? Traditionally, the primary role of military 
peacekeepers is to interpose between belligerents and serve as external guarantors 
of a ceasefire agreement in order to avert further bloodshed and create an enabling 
environment in which peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding can take 
place through the efforts of civilian and humanitarian missions. AMIB, as an inte-
grated peace mission, performed the traditional peacekeeping role but could not, 
due to its resource limitations as part of the challenges of the triangular area of 
tension in African peacekeeping, contribute meaningfully to peacebuilding efforts 
and to some extent this also applies to peacemaking, although the peace process 
was ongoing behind the scenes.
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The AU’s achievements in Burundi should not be over-romanticised since 
AMIB’s experiences raised a number of concerns. AMIB operation brought to the 
fore what Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008) call a triangular area of tension 
in AU peace operations, that is, the resource and capacity constraints often associ-
ated with African peacekeeping, which did not allow the mission to fully imple-
ment its mandate. The UN Secretary General (UNSG), in a report on Burundi, 
acknowledged: ‘The financial and logistic constraints under which AMIB is oper-
ating prevent the force from fully implementing its mandate.’9 AMIB’s lack of 
required financial resources originated from three sources. First, within Africa, 
the AU member states were not enthusiastic in providing the requisite funds to the 
mission. A clear indication of this was the AU Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) where it ruled that the TCCs were to be self-sustained for up to 2 months 
of the operation. Based on this ‘self-sustainment concept’, both Ethiopia and 
Mozambique were able to deploy their troops with external support. The implica-
tion of the self-sustainment concept of AMIB operation for the TCCs was uncov-
ered by de Coning when he succinctly asserted that ‘Even then their (that is, 
Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents) deployment was delayed, and once 
deployed their operational status was affected by ongoing financial constraints 
and uncertainty’ (de Coning, 2004). Second, the AU itself was financially and 
logistically incapacitated. Its resources limitations were also due to the fact that 
since its inauguration, the AU had been operating with a budget deficit, which 
made the institution rely on external donors for its peace operations (Okumu, 
2009, p. 105). Therefore, the institution was unable to provide sufficient funds for 
its peace mission and relied on financially incapacitated TCCs to fund the deploy-
ment and sustenance of their troops. Third, the UN’s indifferent attitude towards 
this problem confirmed its unwillingness to sufficiently fund the operation. This 
can be partly explained by the fact that the AU was newly established and its 
future was not completely certain. Given the questionable character of the OAU, 
coupled with the fact that AMIB was the AU’s pioneering mission, donors were 
not enthusiastic in adequately supporting AMIB in the way the AU had expected. 
Powell (2005) argued that the AU was asked to reduce AMIB’s budget when it 
was first presented to the UNSC because according to the UN, the budget was too 
large, and that the human and material resources proposed for AMIB by the AU, 
in the opinion of the UN, were too ambitious for African peacekeeping. However, 
in addition to being insufficient, the funds were disbursed very slowly, which was 
also a source of the problems the AU faced with AMIB operation.
The operational budget of AMIB was estimated at around $110 million for 1 
year (Boshoff & Dara, 2003, p. 43). This amount is exorbitant, in the African 
context, considering the dwindling nature of the economic situation across many 
African countries. It is important to emphasise the fact that only five African 
countries—Nigeria, South Africa, Gaddaffi’s Libya, Egypt and Algeria—pay 75 
per cent of the AU budget. The AU Commission’s budget for 2004 was approxi-
mately $32 million (de Coning, 2004). At the end of the operation, AMIB’s total 
budget stood at $134 million. With its financial resource limitations, the AU relied 
on external donors to fund AMIB’s budget. Aboagye (2004, p. 15) writes that
…the pledges from the partners, amounting to some $50 million, fell far short of 
the budget. Even worse, actual donations into the trust fund amounted to just 
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$10 million, even though this excluded in-kind assistance from the US ($6.1 million) 
and UK ($6 million), to support the deployment of the Ethiopian and Mozambican 
contingents respectively.10
These financial limitations, coupled with the piecemeal approach adopted by the 
EU and other donors in disbursing the money pledged, hindered AMIB’s opera-
tional performance.
AMIB was also challenged by the AU’s lack of institutional capacity and logis-
tics. As I mentioned earlier, AMIB was authorised when the AU was newly estab-
lished, and the APSA’s institutions were just evolving. These conditions 
incapacitated the AU in organising deployment. The AU’s lack of capacity led 
South Africa to provide leadership and plan the mission. Besides, the late arrival 
of the Ethiopian and Mozambican troops also revealed the AU’s lack of logistical 
resources that hindered the efficacy of the peace operation at the initial stages. 
The troops would have been quickly deployed if the AU itself had been well 
resourced and equipped for its peace operations. The AU’s lack of logistics, espe-
cially modern equipment, negatively affected the mission’s ability to deliver on its 
revised RoE for civilian protection, as it was unable to move out of secured areas.
Since AMIB’s deployment was based on the understanding that the mission 
will be replaced by a UN peace mission when the Burundi security situation 
becomes normalised enough for such a deployment, the AU established a strategic-
level AU/UN engagement to mobilise resources, as well as to receive in-theatre 
administrative and logistical assistance from the UN system. These included tech-
nical capacity support that AMIB received from the UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC). The UN support to AMIB included benefits from 
MONUC’s experience in the areas of public information, headquarters adminis-
tration and DDR. Also, as part of the operational-level collaboration, AMIB 
consulted with international agencies such as the EU, UNICEF and World Bank. 
The consultation was crucial for AMIB to source funds and other assistance for 
the DDR programme and also in its implementation of the ceasefire agreement 
tasks.
AMIB operation also revealed how the determination and commitment of a 
lead state can fill the gap created by the capacity deficiencies of a peace operation-
authorising institution and make such a peace mission a reality. It should be 
recalled that the appointment of Nelson Mandela as the new facilitator for the 
Burundian peace process in November 1999 saw the inroad of South Africa’s 
diplomacy and resources in Burundi. Mandela did not only successfully negotiate 
the Arusha Agreement but also used his good offices to secure Pretoria’s consent 
in deploying SAPSD to prevent the peace process from falling apart. AMIB would 
have been an impossible mission without the leadership, and human, military and 
financial resources from South Africa (Williams, 2006). The AU was hamstrung 
by its lack of resources and also in its force generation inability. A study con-
ducted by a Durban-based NGO African Centre for the Constructive Resolution 
of Disputes (ACCORD) found that South Africa played a significant role in 
the transitional operation and was ‘the largest force present on the ground, con-
tributing approximately 1,500 troops, which proved a determining factor for the 
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deployment of the mission’ (ACCORD, 2007, p. 31). Probably this is why a 
Swedish defence analyst argued that although AMIB was an AU mission on paper, 
in reality it was a mission that wholly relied on the leadership of one single TCC, 
South Africa (Svensson, 2008, p. 17).
Given all the numerous challenges mentioned above that were skilfully negoti-
ated, AMIB could be described as a relatively successful peace operation when 
compared with the previous African peacekeeping operations, especially under 
the OAU regime. Overall, one would describe AMIB as a partially successful 
peace operation, for the mission was able to achieve the traditional peacekeeping 
goals; however, it could not achieve much in its DDR and economic stability 
mandate. AMIB raised the hope that Africans can manage African conflicts 
despite the fact that the APSA’s institutions were in the process of being 
established when the mission was deployed.
Lessons Learnt and Future Outlook
This article explored AMIB to question the role of the AU as a security actor in 
Africa, and the optimism embedded in the APSA, in terms of its ability to guaran-
tee African security through a proactive rather than reactionary approach to the 
continent’s security challenges. AMIB was deployed in a very dangerous security 
environment and at a time when the APSA institutions were just evolving. The 
mission recorded some successes, notably in stabilising security in the country 
and thereby creating favourable conditions for the promotion of other important 
tasks, such as the DDR programme, security sector reform and other institutional 
reforms, such as human rights and economic stability. All these positive outcomes 
can be related to a succeeding UN mission for the advancement of peace in 
Burundi. Despite these achievements, the challenges facing the AU in relation to 
mounting and sustaining its peace operations have brought to the fore what 
Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008) call a triangular area of tension in AU 
peace operations. As far as AMIB operation is concerned, I conclude that the AU 
has not been able to bridge the gap between its ambition and capacity for running 
totally successful peace operations.
AMIB revealed the commitment of the AU, as an institution, to implement the 
peace and security norms embedded in its Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol. 
The AU and RPI recognised that the existence of peace in Burundi would contrib-
ute to and improve the security situation in the Great Lakes region. Consequently, 
the pan-African institution deployed AMIB despite the fact that there was no com-
prehensive peace agreement in place. Without question, AMIB’s deployment 
demonstrated the AU’s ambitions and will to deliver on its promises of securing 
the continent and its people. Furthermore, the AU’s commitment to implement its 
security framework is part of the institution’s efforts to fill gaps in the continent’s 
peace and security agenda, especially in mobilising a peacekeeping mission in 
African conflicts when the UN is reluctant to intervene.
The AU’s ambition was overshadowed by its capacity limitations and a lack of 
political will on the part of AU member states. AMIB’s challenges included a lack 
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of resources, logistics and funding, all of which contributed to the AU’s capacity 
weakness to manage peace operations efficiently. Despite the fact that the mainte-
nance of international peace and security is the responsibility of the international 
community, the fact that AMIB was envisaged to give way to a UN peace mission 
is a clear indication of the AU’s acceptance of its organisational weakness as well 
as its resources and capacity limitations. Besides, the AU member states’ unenthu-
siastic stance in relation to providing sufficient financial support to the mission 
has raised serious questions about African ownership of and control over the oper-
ationalisation of the APSA and AU peace operations. The gap between the AU’s 
ambitions on the one hand and its capacity along with member states’ agendas on 
the other is a reminder of the regional-sceptics’ arguments in terms of the reliabil-
ity and effectiveness of the AU’s integrated peace and security agenda and the 
running of regional peace operations. The triangular area of tension remains a 
challenge for the AU, in the operationalisation of its peacebuilding agenda and to 
ultimately free Africa from virulent armed conflicts.
In spite of these challenges, I conclude this article with a reflection on some 
lessons that were learned from AMIB’s experiences by the AU for planning future 
AMIB-like peace operations in Africa. The most pertinent of these are discussed 
here. The AU’s experiences in Burundi underlined the importance of prompt AU 
interventions in African armed conflicts for peace and stability in Africa. In 
Burundi, the AU deployed AMIB first as a stabilisation force in preparation for a 
multidimensional UN peace mission to be mounted later when the conditions 
allowed for such a deployment. This is a major achievement since the deployment 
of a UN mission takes a long time. The prompt deployment of AMIB filled the 
gap between the outbreak of the conflict and the presence of ONUB that took over 
AMIB in May 2004.
AMIB suffered a lack of financial resources. Financial constraints compelled 
the AU to rely heavily on international funding partners for assistance for its peace 
operation in Burundi. Thus, AMIB was a donor-driven and donor-dependent 
peace operation and this situation demonstrated that the AU did not perform well 
in the area of financing its peace operation in Burundi. Excessive reliance on 
external donors for the sustainability of the AU’s peace missions is problematic as 
such a practice risks loss of control over such support and, by extension, its peace 
operations in the African context. Besides, the piecemeal fashion in which the 
donors were disbursing pledged funds to the AU for AMIB operation calls for the 
AU to look for alternative ways (besides the member states’ contributions) to fund 
and sustain its peace missions, pending the arrival of donor contributions, which 
may take up to 6 months. The dangers of excessive reliance on external donors for 
peace operation are illustrated by the Ethiopian and Mozambican experiences in 
AMIB. Once these contingents were deployed in Burundi with the assistance of 
the US and the UK, respectively, their sustainability became the responsibility of 
South Africa. Thus, the leadership role played by South Africa helped AMIB to be 
a relative success story. The South African role in Burundi underscored the impor-
tance of the AU’s need of the resources of a lead African nation (or nations) to be 
involved in the mission for the (mission) sustainability, at least for the first few 
Badmus 17
months of African peace missions.11 AMIB could not have been a relatively 
successful peace mission without Pretoria’s commitment and resources. Nigeria’s 
leadership role in the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) 
peace missions in West Africa is also a good example of this effort. In the 1990s, 
the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group’s (ECOMOG) troops were deployed in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 
absence of proper logistics and financial arrangements in place. Lack of resources 
denied many ECOWAS member states to deploy to these missions but Abuja 
shouldered responsibility as the lead nation of the ECOWAS peace operations in 
both countries. The costs of the operations were largely borne by Nigeria. AMIB 
and ECOWAS examples underlined the needs for predictable funding for African 
peace operations and also the needs for the AU and other African sub-regional 
organisations to reflect on how best to finance their future peace operations and 
also how the larger international community can fund African peace missions 
expediently and adequately to ensure that the African institutions are not set up to 
fail during the onset of their peacekeeping roles.
AMIB has had some successes because it operated on a clear mandate and 
RoE. Powell offered a critique of AMIB’s mandate when she said ‘…AMIB was 
tasked with a mandate it could not possibly fulfil and its resources were not 
aligned with its requirements.’ Powell’s argument suggests that a clear mandate 
alone is not enough by itself for a successful peace operation. At the strategic 
level, mission planners need to operate a peace mission on a realistic and robust 
mandate to cater to the exigencies on the ground in line with resources, both 
human and material, that are required to be at the AU’s disposal. In Burundi, 
AMIB directed efforts towards the implementation of the key aspects of the peace 
agreement at the initial stage of the peace mission. Additionally, AMIB operation 
underlined the important role of the offices of the Special Representatives of 
Chairperson of the AU Commission. The credibility and diplomatic acumen of 
the political head of AMIB, Ambassador Bah, helped the African mission 
tremendously in achieving cooperation from the warring parties. The experience, 
credibility and respect that the Burundian political players have for Ambassador 
Bah helped the mission to achieve its mandate and also helped AMIB and the UN 
to work together in a harmonious manner in this theatre of peace operations. 
Besides, the influence and credibility of the facilitators of the Burundian peace 
process, Julius Nyerere and later Nelson Mandela, contributed to the success 
of the mission. AMIB precedent showed that peace operations and peace pro-
cesses tended to be successful when the peace negotiators and HoMs are influen-
tial and credible personalities with extensive political and diplomatic skill and 
experience.
Finally, one important method that must be obviously accepted in African 
peacemaking processes is the recognition of and ownership by local population. A 
peace process must be people-centred and also owned by the people for the benefit 
of the people. In Burundi, the peace process was owned by the people of the 
country, for the representatives of local populations and the Burundian civil 
society groups/agencies were pivotal in the peace process while post-conflict 
peacebuilding efforts were people-centred as well. The post-conflict peace- 
building efforts targeted assistance towards those affected by the conflict. 
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Ownership of the Burundian peace process by the government and the people of 
Burundi and the way the DDR process and national rebuilding were conceptual-
ised in the context of the peace operation helped AMIB to be a success story 
overall.
Notes
 1. AMIB was preceded by South Africa’s military deployment in Burundi—the South 
African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD).
 2. Due to its dismal failures in conflict management, the OAU established in 1993a 
security mechanism known as the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution (OAU Mechanism) under the coordination of the Central 
Organ. The Mechanism was established as an institutionalised approach to conflict 
prevention and management rather than the previous ad hoc responses to African 
conflicts. Unfortunately, the OAU Mechanism was marginalised by African states and 
therefore became ineffective.
 3. AU 2002, Article 5(1).
 4. These armed groups further splintered into four principal groups. The original 
CNDD—FDD was under the leadership of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, while the 
major CNDD—FDD’s faction was led by Charles Nkrurunziza. The major faction of 
the FNL was led by Agathon Rwasa, while a small faction of the PALIPEHUTU—
FNL was led by Alain Mugabarabona.
 5. These odds included the accusation that Mandela was biased to the Hutu cause.
 6. Both UPRONA and FRODEBU were among the 13 parties that signed the agreement.
 7. AMIB’s deployment had been approved by the Heads of State meeting of the Central 
Organ at its 7th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 3 February 2003. 
 8. The third deputy from Uganda did not deploy.
 9. See Report of the UN Secretary General on Burundi, S72004/210, 16 March 2004.
10. Aboagye (2004, p. 15) gives details of the contributions and pledges as follow: (i) 
AU Peace Fund: $300,000; (ii) Italy: €200,000; (iii) EU: €25 million, earmarked 
for Burundi, with the understanding that unless peace was restored in Burundi, any 
investment would be wasted and would not achieve its desired ends; (iv) USA: $6.1 
million for airlift of Ethiopian contingent and 60 days’ sustainment in the mission 
area; (v) UK: $6 million for the Mozambican contingent; (vi) South Africa: funding 
for the Mozambican contingent; (vii) Denmark: approximately $1 million for insignia 
and medals; (viii) Germany: €400,00; and (ix) other unspecified commitments when 
redeemed.
11. Relying on the resources of lead nations in peace operations, if not well planned, may 
result in such nations influence and pursuit of their agendas within the mission.
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